## Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: IS DRAFT GUIDANCE ON OPTION III

REF: A. NATO 3560 B. STATE 135536 C. STATE 152142 D. MBFR VIENNA 334

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WE CANNOT ACCEPT PRESENT PARA 1 OR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES FOR PARA 3 OF THE IS TEXT OF DRAFT GUIDANCE ON OPTION III AS THEY STAND.

1. AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED, PARA 1 OF THE IS DRAFT GIVES PRECEDENCE TO THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE TANK ARMY OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE GIVEN SECONDARY STATUS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER ONE OR THE OTHER WILL HAVE TO BE MENTIONED FIRST IN THE TEXT; HOWEVER, TO UNDERLINE THE POINT THAT WE ATTACH EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OBJECTIVES (A POINT WE DO NOT FEEL IS ADEQUATELY MADE BY THE PRESENT DRAFT) WE WOULD PROPOSE THE ADDITION OF A LEAD-IN SENTENCE WHICH WOULD MENTION BOTH OBJECTIVES, POSSIBLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: "IN THEIR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED ON 22D NOVEMBER, 1973, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ALLIES PROPOSED, INTER ALIA, THAT IN PHASE I THERE SHOULD BE REDUCTIONS BY US AND SOVIET FORCES AND A COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES AS TO THE

OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND PHASE. SPECIFICALLY THE ALLIES PROPOSED ETC..."

- 2. FURTHER, THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN THE FIRST HALF OF PARA 1 DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT WHAT WAS PROPOSED TO THE EAST REGARDING THE COMMON CEILING IN THE 22 NOVEMBER PRESENTATION. AT THAT TIME WE SAID THAT THE COMMON CEILING "MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE." SINCE THE FIRST HALF OF PARA 1 PURPORTS TO BE A SUMMARY OF THE NOVEMBER PRESENTATION IT MUST REFLECT THAT FORMULATION.
- 3. REGARDING THE SECOND HALF OF PARA 1, WE CONTINUE TO OPPOSE CHANGING THE ALLIANCE POSITION TO REQUIRE, IN PHASE I, A NUMERICALLY DEFINED COMMON CEILING, FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN REF B, PARA 3. MISSION SHOULD EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THAT ASKING THE EAST TO AGREE TO A SPECIFIC REDUCTION OUTCOME AND THUS IN EFFECT TO A SPECIFIC REDUCTION FIGURE FOR PHASE II, IS INEVITABLY TO INVITE EASTERN COUNTERDEMANDS FOR, INTER ALIA, SPECIFYING IN PHASE I EUROPEAN PHASE II REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS, THUS OPENING A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS SECRET

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RELATING TO PHASE II WHICH THE ALLIANCE HAS SO FAR SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO ADDRESS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS EASTERN RESPONSE TO OPTION III UNTIL THE ALLIANCE MADE SUCH DECISIONS ON PHASE II.

4. FOR REASONS SET FORTH IN REF C, PARA 7, WE CONTINUE
TO PREFER THAT SOME MENTION OF THE THREATENING OR
DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS RATIONALE BE INCLUDED IN PARA 3 OF
THE GUIDANCE. IN OUR VIEW THE ADD-ON RATIONALE IS A LESS
EFFECTIVE BARRIER AGAINST FURTHER EASTERN DEMANDS FOR
EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS, SINCE LOGICALLY ONE ADD-ON SUGGESTS
THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ADD-ONS. THE DESTABILIZING
ELEMENT RATIONALE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHICH ENVISAGES

OFFSETTING REDUCTIONS, CONTAINS A BUILT-IN BARRIER TO FURTHER PRESSURES FOR EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS.

5. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THERE IS ANY REAL INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN OUR PREFERENCE FOR INCLUDING THE THREATENING ELEMENTS RATIONALE AND THE WISHES OF OTHER ALLIES TO EMPHASIZE THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND TO PRESENT OPTION III AS A ONE-TIME CONCESSION. MISSION SHOULD EMPHASIZE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THOUGH OUR APPROACHES DIFFER SOMEWHAT, OUR UNDERLYING PURPOSE IS THE SAME. THE LOGIC OF OUR REDUCTION DEMANDS ON THE EAST IS THAT IT IS THE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES AND THE NATURE OF THE EASTERN GROUND FORCES WHICH ARE THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENT FOR INSTABILITY IN THE NGA. OPTION III IS BEING

PUT FORWARD NOT AS AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE AIR AND NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, BUT AS A ONE-TIME OFFER TO THE EAST TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREAT REPRESENTED BY US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, AND ABOVE ALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO OUR DEMAND FOR REDUCTIONS IN THEIR GROUND FORCES. WE WOULD EMPHASIZE TO THE EAST THAT THIS EXCHANGE CONSTITUTED A UNIQUE TRADE ASSOCIATED ONLY WITH PHASE I OBJECTIVES.

6. ACCORDINGLY, WE SUGGEST THAT MISSION TRY TO INCORPORATE THIS CONCEPT INTO THAT SECTION OF PARA 3 BEGINNING "ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MAY NOTE", THEREBY EMPHASIZING THE CONTINUED ALLIED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES, SECRET

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WHILE USING BOTH THE THREATENING ELEMENTS RATIONALE AND THE "UNIQUE TRADE" IDEA AS A BARRIER TO SOVIET PRESSURE FOR FURTHER EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS.

- 7. MISSION SHOULD SUGGEST THAT PARA BEGINNING "THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IF AND WHEN PRESSED..." BE INCLUDED IN AN INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENT, RATHER THAN IN GUIDANCE TO AHG. IN OUR VIEW, SUCH A STATEMENT MADE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INITIAL PRESENTATION OF OPTION III TO THE EAST WOULD DETRACT FROM ITS NEGOTIATING IMPACT. THE POINT SHOULD RATHER BE MADE AT A LATER STAGE AFTER WE HAVE A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE TO OPTION III. MOREOVER, WE THINK FOR PURPOSES OF GUIDANCE, THE POINT IS ADEQUATELY MADE BY INCLUSION OF THE "UNIQUE TRADE" CONCEPT.
- 8. WE HOPE SOME RESOLUTION OF THE DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS PROBLEM CAN BE FOUND ALONG THESE LINES. WITH REGARD TO THE SPECIFIED COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE DISPUTE IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE, AND THAT FURTHER MODIFICATIONS MAY HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. HOWEVER, MISSION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US HAS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO ITS POSITION ON THE COMMON CEILING AND THE

THREATENING ELEMENTS RATIONALE AND REGARDS THEM AS IMPORTANT. IF DEADLOCK CONTINUES ON THIS PORTION OF DRAFT GUIDANCE, MISSION MAY WISH TO SUGGEST THAT SPC MOVE ON TO OTHER ISSUES AND RETURN TO THIS ONE AT A LATER POINT. KISSINGER

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**BONN** MBFR VIENNA **USNMR SHAPE** USCINCEUR Type: TE

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